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THE LAW OF ESCAPE IN CIVIL ACTIONS.
(Continuedfi'om the July No., ante,p. 422.)
IV. AcTIoN FOR AN ESCAPE.
1. In general.-By the common law the sheriff and every jailer
ought to kep persons in execution in 8alva custodia, and if such
prisoner escape, an action upon the case lies against the custodian:
3 Com. Dig. 571. The bonsequence of a voluntary escape in civil
cases is to make the sheriff responsible in an action of debt fgr
the debt for which the prisoner was confined on final process:
Lash v. Ziglar, 5 Iredell 702; the sheriff, however, being allowed
to prove that the prisoner was insolvent at the time of his arrest,
and then the plaintiff shall recover only for the damages he has sustained: Shuldr v. Garrison, 5 W. & S. 455; Pattersonv. Wes-"
tervelt, 17 Wend. 543; Smith v. Hart, 1 Brevard 146. But if
the plaintiff retakes the prisoner after an escape, whether voluntary
or negligent, he cannot afterwards proceed against the sheriff:
Bais8ett v. Salter, 2 lod. 136 ; Ethevie v. Brewell, Comb. 396 ;
and upon principle, it would seem that when the prisoner returns,
after a voluntary escape, and the plaintiff has assented to con-

sider him in custody at his suit, the sheriff would be equally discharged: 2 Bouv. Inst. 549. If, however, the plaintiff withholds
his assent to consider a returned prisoner again in custody, thte
action will lie: 3 Co. 44, a; 1 Rol. Abr. 306, 1.13; 3 Com. Dig.
576. At the same time the removal of a prisoner having the
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liberties of the jail from the limits thereof by virtue of a legal
process, which affords justification to the officer taking him thence,
is not an escape within 2 Rev. Stat. 437, § 63 (1864); Wilikens v.
Willei, 4 Abb. (N. Y.) App. Dec. 596. In an action for an escape,
whether voluntary or negligent, on mesne process, after the return
of the writ, a voluntary return before suit brought is no defence:
Sone v. Woods, 5 John. 181. After an arrest on mesne process,
the officer having suffered a voluntary escape, may retake party:
Anold, v. Slives, 10 Wend. 514. See also Bronso v. Noye, 7
Wend. 188.
Also, if a party is in custody on final process, he cannot be retaken after a voluntary escape; otherwise after a negligent escape:
Butler v. Washburn, 25 N. H. (5 Fost.) 251. The fact that the
prisoner was recaptdred in. another state, by a sheriff of New York,
after a negligent escape from his custody here, is not a ground for
granting the prisoner's application for a discharge from custody :
Lockwood v. Hercereau, 6 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 206. An officer is
not bound to retake a prisoner if the escape is voluntary and under
civil process: Olark v. Cleveland, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 344. And if a
sheriff voluntarily per.mits a debtor in execution to escap&, he -cannot retake him; and if the creditor will not authorize a recapture
this is not such a discharge of the debtor from imprisonment as
will discharge the debt, and the sheriff will be liable for the same:
Jackson v. H~ampton, 6 Ired. (N. C.) L. 84. A sheriff cannot
take notice of an attorney's privilege after he has, once arrested
him: Secor v. Bell, 18 Johns. 52. Where there has been an
escape, and the prisoner dies before recapture, although there has
been a fresh pursuit, the escape is not purged. In civil cases if a
party escapes, who is in custody in mesne process, he may be retaken any time before the return day: Commonwealth v. Sheriff,
i Giant (Pa.) 187. But if the party is held on final process, the
sheriff becomes absolutely liable for th. debt and costs by suffering
the prisoner to go at large, and 4e cannot again imprison him : Id.
Where the prisoner escaped through the insufficiency of the prison
and not through any neglect of the sheriff, and the sheriff obtained
a'n escape warrant and retook the prisoner before the issue joined:
.Held, that such retaking would not excuse the sheriff: Parsonsv.
Lee, Jeff: (Va.) 50. Insufficiency of the county jail, held no defence to action for escape: Kepler v. Barker, -13 Ohio St. 17
(1862).
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The Virginia statute (1 Rev. Cod., cl. 186, § 1), which "for the
nore effectual retaking and securing persons who escape out of
prison," enacts that "if any person committed, rendered or'charged
in custody in execution, or upon inesne process, to any county or
corporation prison, or to the jail of any district, shall thence escape"
a justice of the peace may issue an escape wirrant, does not
authorize the issue of such warrant in the case of a person who
escap~es out of the custody of a sheriff before committed to prison:
2ff' (hJuntic v. Lockridge, 11 Leigh (Va.) 253.
2. Who may bring the action.-An administratrix may maintain
this action in her own name for the escape of a prisoner who is in
execution on a judgment obtained by her as administratrix : Bonafous v. Walker, 2 T. R. 126. Indeed any party aggrieved by
the default, misconduct or delinquency of the sheriff or by his
deputy or subordinate, may bring this action: Clute v. Goodell, 2
McLean 193 ; Lawrence v. Sherman, Id. 488 ; and this in addition
to any other fine, punishment or proceeding which may be authorized
by law in New York : 3 Rev. Stats. 5th ed. 739, sect. 98. An action
is also maintainable by the assigns of the plaintiff if for the wrong
done to the property rights or int.erests of the assignor, the right
of action would survive to the executor or administrator (3 Rev.
Stats. 5th ed. 746, sect. 1) : Zabriskie v. Smith, 8 Kern. 322 ; McKee v. Judd, 2 Id. 622; The People v. Tioga Gommon Pleas, 19
Wend. 73. See Dininney v. Fay, 38 Barb. Sup. Ct. 18. It
seems to have been at *one time doubted whether the executor could have an action against the sheriff for an escape upon
mesne process, though there never was any doubt about the executor's right of action for an escape on final process. But upon
principle, as Mr. Chitty says (see 1 Chit. P1. 79, 80), he may also
have an action upon mesne process, the principle -upon which the
action is maintained being that the body is a pledge for the debt,
and by the loss of the pledge the estate is injured. An executor
has maintained an action fdr a false return to final process: Williams's Ex'r v. Cary, 4 Mod. 403, on the ground that it was an
injury to estate. A fortiori an escape is an injury. The North
Carolina Act of 1777 gives an action of debt for an escape against
the executors of the sheriff as well as to the executors of the creditor: Wriqht v. Roberts, 6 Ired. 147 (Rev. 0. 105, sect. 20).
3. Against whom action to be brought.-The action for escape
shall be brought against him who has the custody of the jail: Com.
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Dig. 574. Though he has it de facto only and not de jure: 2 Inst.
381-2. And it shall be against the sheriff, not against his deputy:
2 Inst. 382; 1 Rol. Abr. 94, 1. 30; semb. Hard. 34. A sheriff is
liable for the acts of his deputy done under color of office whenever
the deputy would be liable for the same acts : Knowlton v. Bartlett,
1 Pick. (Mass.) 271; Marshall v. Roamer, 4 Mass. 60; Bon v.
Ward, 7 Id. 123; Waterhouse v. Waite, 11 Id. 207; Tobey v.
Leonard, 15 Id. 200; Smith v. Joiner, 1 D. Chip. (Vt.) 62. In
Virginia the high sheriff alone is liable for the official acts of his
deputy, unless in a case where a special remedy is provided against
the latter: White v. Johnson, 1 Wash. (Va.) 159. A sheriff in
Virginia is ex officio jailer and is liable for the misconduct of. his
turnkey or servant: lDabney v. Talliaferro,4 Rand. (Va.) 256.
A marshal is liable in a civil action for the acts of his deputy done
by virtue of his office. Such action may be brought against both:
Cotton v. Marsh, 3 Wis. 221.
In California, a sheriff is responsible for the acts of his deputy,
but not so far as to require of the sheriff impossibilities or to impose unconscionable exactions: Whitney v. Butterfield, 13 Cal.
335. In Kentucky, a sheriff is responsible for all the official acts
of his deputies, and for any nonfeasance or unintentional misfeasance (as for taking insufficient security) he alone is liable, nor can
an action be maintained against his deputy: Murrellv. Smith, 2
Dana (Ky.) 462 ; Owens v. Gatewood, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 494. The
sheriff and deputy cannot be sued jointly for a tort done by the
deputy alone: Campbell v. Philps, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 62. In law,
t'he sheriff aid his deputy are considered as one officer: .Watson v.
Todd, 5 Mass. 271; Perley v. Foster,9 Id. 112; Vinton v. Bradford, 13 Id. 114; Congdon v. Cooper, 15 Id. 10; Jentry v. Runt,
2 McCord (S. C.) 410; Hazard v. Israel, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 240;
Modre v. l.awney, 3 Hen. & Munf. (Va.) 127 ; -Estes v. Williams,
Cooke (Tenn.) 413; Prewitt v. Neal, Minor (Ala.) 386. The
sheriff is therefore responsible for all official neglect or misconduct of his deputy, and also for his acts not required by law
where he assumes to act under cover of office; but he is not responsible for the neglect of any act or duty which the law does not
require the deputy officially to perform: Clute v. Goodell, 2 McLean 193 ; Harringtonv. Fuller, 18 Me. 277 ; Lawson v. Sherman,-2 McLean 488; State v. Moore, 19 Mo. 369. But any one
charged with the execution of a writ by the power whence it
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emanated, is liable for a neglect of duty under it. Therefore the
bailiff of a liberty having the return and execution of writs, is answerable for the escape of a prisoner arrested by him under a writ
with the sheriff's mandate thereon: 2 T. R. 5; Com. Dig. 575.
At common law, a stranger cannot sue a deputy sheriff for the
breach or non-performance of his official duties. The principal
sheriff is liable to persons thus injured, and the deputy is liable to
his principal. The same rule applies in the case of the Commonwealth, in the absence of any statute rendering the deputy liable
to it; and the sheriff and his sureties are liable for such breach:
Harlan v. Lumaden, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 86.

Compare (Calvinv. Hol-

brook, 2 N. Y. (2 Comst.) 126. A joint action will not lie against
a sheriff and his deputy for the acts of the deputy: Moulton v.
NYorton, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 303.
4. Damage.-The liability in equity of a sheriff for an escape,
is the loss actually sustained, and the court will ascertain the
amount of damages: Moore v. Moore, 25 Beav. 8; 4 Jur. N. S.
250; 27 L. J. Chanc. 385. Actual injury is the proper measure
subject to evidence in mitigation, as, e. g., insolvency: Hootman v.;
Shriner, "15 Ohio St. 43 (1864). The measure of damages is the
value of the custody of the debtor at the time of the escape; but
in estimating such value the jury is not limited to the consideration
of the actual available means of the debtor, but they may consider,
according to the evidence of the case, the value of the chances of
the creditor's obtaining payment by continuing such imprisonment:
Macrae v. Clarke, 1 H. & R. 479; Law Rep. 1 C. P. 403; 35 L. J.
C. P. 247; 12 Jur. N. S. 708; 14 W. R. 655; 14 Law Times
N. S. 408.
In Pennsylvania, the statutes 13 Edw. 1, c. 11 (Westm. 2), and
1 Rich. 2, c. 12, are in force: Shewell v. Fell, 3 Yeates 17, s. c.
4 Yeates 47, and in an action of debt against the sheriff the jury,
if they find for the plaintiff, must find the whole debt and costs:
Id.; Duncan v. Klinefelter, 5 Watts 141. But if the action be
in case, it is otherwise: Shuler v. Garrison,5 'K. & S. 455. In
case, the measure of damages is the actual loss sustained, and it is
competent in case to prove the insolvency of the defendant, but in
debt it is not: Snyder v. Commonwealth, I Penna. 94; IKirsh
v. Commonwealth, 3 Barr 269. See also Wolverton v. Commonwealth, 7 S. & R. 273.

But actual injury is not the proper measure of damageg where

